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Abstract 
 
Why did productivity rise during recent recessions? One possibility is that average 
worker quality increased.  A second is that each incumbent worker produced more.  The 
second effect is termed “making do with less.” Using data from 2006 to 2010 on 
individual worker productivity from a large firm, these effects can be measured and 
separated.  For this firm, most of the gain in productivity during the recession was a result 
of increased effort.  Additionally, the increase in effort is correlated with the increase in 
the local unemployment rate, presumably reflecting the costs of losing a job. 
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 Productivity rose during the recent recession.  From 2007 to 2009, aggregate output fell 
by 7.16 percent, but the aggregate number of hours worked decreased by 10.01 percent in 
nonfarm business.
1
  Input fell by more than output, which implies that productivity increased. 
More surprising, the growth in productivity during the recession outstripped the growth in 
productivity both in the period directly preceding and the period directly following the recession.    
From 2007 quarter 4, the start of the recession, to 2009 quarter 3, the quarter following the 
recession, labor productivity rose by 3.16% in nonfarm businesses.  From 2006 quarter 1 through 
2007 quarter 3 productivity rose by only 2.21%.    
 There are two obvious possibilities that can account for the rise in productivity. The first 
is that the decline in the workforce resulted in average worker quality that was higher during the 
recession than in the preceding period.  The second is that each worker produced more while 
holding worker quality constant.  This effect is termed “making do with less,” that is, getting the 
same output from fewer workers. 
 There are both theoretical and empirical questions that need to be answered.  The most 
important empirical issue is determining how much of the increase in productivity is explained 
by increased effort, and how much can be explained by compositional effects, i.e., having better 
workers on average during the recession.
2
  
                                                 
1
 The recession was from December 2007 through June 2009.   The drop in output and aggregate number of hours 
worked are measured from the fourth quarter 2007, the start of the recession, through the third quarter 2009, the 
quarter following the recession.  Data come from the BLS and exclude farm workers. 
2
 Other research makes reallocation – either of workers or of firms – the source of rising productivity over the cycle.  
Berger (2012) argues that labor productivity rises in recessions because firms restructure during recessions by 
laying off their least productive workers.  His aim is to explain the jobless recoveries in the last three recessions, 
pointing out that output grows but employment lags because the workers are more productive.  His evidence comes 
from a calibration exercise in which he compares his model to several alternative models of the business cycle, 
finding that the labor restructuring model has the greatest explanatory power.  Thus, labor restructuring is a 
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 The most important theoretical issue involves modeling the change in effort that a firm 
may require as the economy moves from normal times into recession. Intuitively, it seems that 
employers push their employees harder during recessions as they cut back the work force and ask 
each of the remaining workers to cover the tasks previously performed by the now-laid-off 
workers. But if it is possible to get more from employees during recessions, why don’t 
employers demand the higher level of output during normal times?  
 There are two conceptual reasons for the rise in productivity.  First, during recessions, 
demand for labor falls, which reduces the wage and other alternatives available to each worker.  
As a consequence, workers, especially those whose next best alternative is now leisure, may be 
willing to work harder for a given wage.  The supply of effort to a given firm depends on a 
worker’s alternatives and, as alternatives become poorer, the supply to a given firm may 
improve.  Even for the market as a whole, the reservation value of effort may decline when the 
number of jobs declines as workers are forced into poorer alternatives. 
 Second, the labor force may change average quality for the same reason.  There is no 
reason to assume that workers of all ability levels are affected equally by the recession.  To the 
extent that some are hurt more than others, the willingness to supply effort to a given firm (or the 
labor market in general) may be altered differentially across groups.  Consequently, firms move 
in the direction of the labor type that is more cost effective and, during recessions, it is possible 
that this favors higher quality workers.   
                                                                                                                                                             
candidate explanation for productivity growth (see also Koenders and Rogerson, 2005, Gali and van Rens, 2010, 
and van Rens, 2004, for models of the rising pro-cyclicality of productivity).  Reallocation of workers across 
businesses can also explain why some businesses are more productive than others in the cross-section (Syverson, 
2011). 
 
  4 
 Is it possible in a standard model for work effort to increase, average ability to increase, 
output to fall and employment to fall when product demand falls? If there is uncertainty 
associated with obtaining another job upon termination, and if work effort affects the probability 
of retaining the current job, the worker will take into account the likelihood of obtaining another 
job in determining his work effort. In times or areas where unemployment is high, job loss is 
especially costly and effort responds accordingly.  As a result, effort is expected to vary directly 
with the unemployment rate, which measures the likelihood of finding a replacement job. This is 
consistent with standard notions of labor supply.  A worker’s willingness to supply labor (effort 
or hours) increases with the wage and decreases with the alternative use of time.  When the 
alternatives are poorer, say because job search is less likely to result in success, it is optimal for a 
worker to respond with increased effort.   
 This theory is taken to the data for one large firm that measures output per worker.  There 
is panel data on individual productivity for over 23,000 moderately skilled workers who perform 
the exact same task at different establishments throughout the United States.  It is therefore 
possible to measure performance outcomes due to effort versus sorting using about 5.6 million 
data points on daily performance from June 2006 to May 2010.   
 The primary finding is that effort varies over the business cycle, rising during periods of 
recession. Productivity increased by 5.4 percent during the recession at this firm,  
 The labor force composition effect is minimal. Nearly all of the increase in productivity 
that occurs during the recession is a consequence of making do with less.  The quality of the 
work force hardly changes.  Instead, the increase in productivity comes about because workers 
work harder.  As effort increases, the task is completed in less time.  Specifically, using the most 
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conservative estimates, composition changes account for, at most, 27 percent of the 5.4 percent 
increase in productivity during the recession.  This figure is obtained from the largest of three 
estimates; first, a comparison of OLS productivity regressions and regressions including worker 
fixed effects suggests the role of sorting is minimal. When worker fixed effects are included, the 
change in productivity that is associated with the recession reflects only increased effort for a 
given worker, averaged across all workers. Second, estimates from a balanced panel of workers 
who were employed throughout the entire period similarly show that productivity for these 
workers rose by 4.8 percent, slightly less than the increase in productivity for the entire sample.  
A final analysis compares mean differences in productivity for workers who stay and workers 
who leave; accumulated attrition accounts for a 1 percent change in productivity over the whole 
recession while new hires increased aggregate productivity by 0.45 percent.  Composition 
changes, estimated with minimal functional form assumptions in this way, account for 1.45/5.4 = 
27 percent of the increase in productivity during the recession. 
 More compelling evidence for the increased-effort effect is that effort varies across 
establishments within the firm even at a point in time.  Worker effort is highest at establishments 
that are located in high unemployment areas; this is true even after accounting for persistent 
differences in productivity between establishments. There is strong cross-sectional variation in 
worker effort that is directly related to local unemployment rates. At a given point in time, those 
establishments that are in high unemployment areas are also those at which worker effort is high. 
At a given establishment, workers increase their effort during periods of high unemployment.  
   Additionally, it is the least productive workers in the pre-recession period who increased 
their effort most in response to the local unemployment rate.   If low productivity workers are the 
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ones least likely to find a replacement job when unemployment rates rise, then, as the model 
shows, it would be logical for low productivity workers to increase their effort most. 
 
I. Theory  
A Rational Model of Changes in Effort and Ability During Recessions 
 Recall that the goal is to understand within the framework of rational firms how effort 
might rise during recessions and how the optimal quality of workers employed might also vary 
with business cycle conditions.  During recessions output falls (or at a specific growing firm, 
output growth slows), employment falls (or in a specific growing firm, employment growth 
slows), output-per-worker rises and average ability of the work force may change. The firm 
makes do with less.  An additional feature (observed empirically during the last recession) is that 
costs fell and profits rose, because cost saving was sufficiently great to offset the reductions in 
demand.   
 The goal is to provide a theoretical structure that allows all the empirical phenomena to 
be captured.  The following model accomplishes that.
 3
 
The Choice of Effort Level 
 Worker quality is indexed by k, where higher levels of k are associated with more able 
workers.  The cost of effort for any type k is given by c(e) / k .  
 The timing, which we believe realistically captures the nature of the typical labor 
contract, is as follows.  The firm calls out the terms of employment, which consist of a wage W, 
and minimum level of effort (or output) requirement, x, which has distribution function G(x) and 
                                                 
3
 See also Lazear (2000a) for an earlier model of optimal effort and compensation choice in an environment of 
heterogeneous worker ability. 
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density g(x).
4
  The worker does not know x precisely, but knows the distribution of requirements 
in the population of firms. At the time of hiring, market conditions that will prevail in the future, 
specifically, the level of the unemployment rate, are unknown. After the worker begins the job, 
the state of the economy becomes known.  If effort falls below the required level, the worker is 
fired.  A terminated worker may find another job, which yields rent net of effort, equal to R.  
Rent R is positive and dominates unemployment, but is lower than the surplus (derived below) 
that is obtainable at the optimal level of effort on the primary job. If the worker does not locate a 
new job, he becomes unemployed, which has value normalized to zero.  Thus, the expected rent 
of a terminated worker is given by (1-u)R where u is the probability that a terminated worker 
remains unemployed. No theory of unemployment is presented here; u is taken as given and 
exogenous, which it is for any particular worker. 
 The tradeoff for the worker is that effort is painful, but the higher the level of effort, the 
less likely is the worker to be terminated for poor performance.  The probability of being 
terminated given any effort level e is merely the probability that effort, e, falls below required 
effort, x, or 1-G(e).  Thus, the worker’s problem is to choose e to maximize expected surplus, 
which is given by 
(1) Surplus = G(e) ( W - c(e)/k ) + [1- G(e)] (1-u) R 
The first term is the probability of surviving in the firm times expected rent at that firm.  The 
second term is the expected rent associated with termination.
5
 
                                                 
4
 The setting of the minimum requirement, x, is taken to be exogenous.  This is analyzed in Lazear (2000b). 
5
 Note that the contract here is one of a fixed wage, rather than a piece rate.  One could envision that the firm would 
condition payment on the ex post observed level of output, e, especially since that is assumed to be known after 
work occurs.  Indeed, in the jobs that we have in mind, e is easily measured and tracked by a computer.  The 
analysis of whether to use a fixed wage or a piece rate is first laid out in Lazear (1986).  There, issues of 
measurement costs and multi-tasking (defined as the tradeoff between quality and quantity) are discussed.  For the 
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 The first-order condition for (1) is 
(2) ∂/∂e =  g(e) [W - c(e)/k - (1-u) R] - G(e) c’(e)/k = 0 
with second-order condition ∂2/∂e2 < 0 for an interior maximum. 
 
 The first result is that effort increases in k.  The more able individuals put forth higher 
levels of effort because the cost of reducing the probability of termination is decreasing in 
ability.  That follows directly from (2) using the implicit function theorem. 
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which is positive because the numerator is positive and the denominator is the second-order 
condition, which must be negative for the solution to the problem to be a maximum. 
 The next result is the key one for the analysis here, namely that a recession creates 
increased effort.  It follows that when the probability of unemployment rises, workers of all 
ability put forth more effort.  This is a result that is found in the efficiency-wage literature, but is 
also a direct implication of standard labor supply theory because labor supply increases when the 
value of alternatives fall.
67
  Using the first-order condition, once again, 
                                                                                                                                                             
purposes here, it is taken as given (and is true) that the firm does not use variable pay to any significant extent. 
6
 The efficiency-wage approach goes further by arguing, mostly implicitly, that rigidities in contracting result in 
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which is positive because the numerator is positive and the denominator is again the second-
order condition which is negative.  Effort increases when the unemployment rate rises.
8
  
 The same analysis also implies that higher wages induce more effort because u and W 
enter in the same way in (2). 
Which workers increase their effort the most?  The first-order effect comes through 
differential changes in unemployment rates.  As an empirical matter, the increase in 
unemployment during recessions tends to be concentrated among the less skilled.  That is not 
quite the same as ability as it is measured here, but if the least talented are more likely to see a 
                                                                                                                                                             
unemployment when effort is a consideration.  This is unnecessary and not an implication of the approach used here.  
We are agnostic on the causes of unemployment and merely take its existence and variation over business cycles as 
a necessary given that induces endogenous changes in optimal effort.  But again, this is nothing more than standard 
labor supply and the results below neither add support to nor contradict the efficiency-wage view. 
7
 Rebitzer (1987) develops a model of individual worker productivity as a function of unemployment.  Workers 
shirk less when the costs of dismissal fall during periods of slack labor markets.  The key is that dismissal costs, 
which include the costs of replacing dismissed workers, fall during periods of high unemployment and the 
alternative wage falls for workers.  Rebitzer shows that in two-digit industries the level of unemployment raises 
productivity growth from 1960 to 1980.  In his model, workers are homogenous within firms – there is no 
reallocation of workers.  The Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) model also has reduced shirking and rising productivity 
during periods of unemployment.   
8
 Note that if the firm indexes wages to unemployment, then 
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empirical evidence suggests 
  
  
   (see, among others, Blanchflower and Oswald 2005) so any wage adjustment 
according to local economic conditions will tend mute the effort response relative to a benchmark of no wage 
adjustment. 
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rise in unemployment than the most talented, the increase in effort should be greater for the least 
talented. Another implication is that those regions or industries that experience the largest 
increase in unemployment during recessions should also witness the largest increase in effort. 
 That implication is not completely unambiguous because the result depends not only on 
which group experiences the greatest increase in unemployment, but also on which group 
responds the most to a given increase in unemployment.  To get at this, it is necessary to sign  
∂(∂e/∂u) / ∂k and the response of effort to a change in unemployment may be increasing in k. 
This is shown in the appendix. The implication as to which group increases effort more in a 
recession is somewhat ambiguous.  Still, there is one clear implication with respect to 
unemployment.  
 Consider two types of workers high, denoted H, and low, denoted L. If changes in the 
unemployment rate for the two groups are duH and duL, respectively, then  
 
lim
du
H L
H
de de

 
0
0
  
As the change in unemployment for the skilled gets small relative to that for the unskilled, the 
change in effort for the unskilled exceeds that for the skilled.  Thus, as long as uL rises enough 
relative to uH, the unskilled will increase their effort by more than the skilled. 
 Although the relative increase in effort across skill groups during recessions remains an 
empirical question, the implication from the logic above is that at least for large differences 
between the increase in unemployment among the low ability and high ability types, the 
expectation is that low ability workers should increase their effort more than high ability 
workers.   
Composition Effects 
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 How does employment vary with market conditions? In order to ascertain this, it is 
necessary to present a model of hiring and determine which workers are retained when market 
conditions are worse than expected.
9
  
 The firm knows the worker’s behavior as determined by (1) and (2).  Recall that R is the 
rent that a worker receives on the alternative job. Using (1), a worker accepts the job if  
(3) G(e) ( W - c(e)/k ) + [1- G(e)] (1-u) R > 0 
Recall that u is unknown at the time of hire so the worker decides whether to accept the job 
based on the expectation of u.  
 Condition (3) implies that there is some k* below which the worker will not accept the 
job so the workers who are successfully hired by the firm are those for whom k>k*.
10
  Suppose 
that the firm gets N applicants (exogenous) in any given period.   If k~f(k) in the population, then 
the firm’s expected profit is given by  
(4) Expected profit = N e k W f k dk
k
[ ( ) ] ( )
*

   
where e(k) is the solution to (2) for worker of ability k.  
 The choice of x, which is the minimum standard against which workers are judged, and 
of W, is the result of maximizing (4) along these two dimensions.  Both W and x enter in (1) and 
(2).  Even though workers do not know x with certainty, the minimum standard x that is actually 
chosen may affect workers’ assumptions about x as they are incorporated into g(x).  For 
example, the density of x may be unbiased, but still may have variation.  Workers’ estimate of x 
could be the true x, plus some random noise that reflects the imprecision of worker estimates.  
                                                 
9
This analysis is based on the model presented in Lazear (2000a). 
10
 There could also be an upper cutoff.  This arises when R depends on k and R rises sufficient with k so that high 
ability workers find that the rent that they receive on the alternative job exceeds that on the one being offered. 
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When the firm chooses a higher x, the distribution of values shift in an unbiased way, but 
workers continue to estimate the minimum effort cutoff imperfectly. 
For the purposes here, finding an analytic solution to (4) is unimportant.  What is 
essential, though, is that there is a distribution of worker abilities in the firm that is the truncated 
distribution derived from f(k) and k*.  Once W and x are determined, k* follows from (3). The 
density of workers who are actually employed at the firm is given by  
 
 
f k
F k
( )
( *)1
    for k>k* 
 and  
 0    for k<k*. 
 
The expected quality in the firm is then given by 
1
1

F k
kf k dk
k( *)
( )
*
   . 
 Intuitively, the structure is as follows.  The firm calls out a wage W and sets a minimum 
standard x.  That induces some workers to accept the job according to (3).  Knowing this, the 
firm chooses W and x so as to maximize expected profits in (4). 
 Why does the firm tolerate different levels of ability within the firm?  As shown in 
Lazear (2000a), the firm would be better off setting an x and W that caters to one particular type 
of worker.  Implicit in the structure is that search is costly.  Because the firm only gets N 
applicants with abilities drawn from f(k), it does not have the luxury of hiring all of one ability 
type.  Attempting to do so would mean that the firm would hire very few people and would 
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sacrifice profit.  Underlying this is that the firm does not operate in a market where there is a 
perfectly elastic supply of workers at all ability levels.  Search costs create a situation where the 
firm is willing to accept workers who do not fit its requirements perfectly.  
 Now consider what happens during a downturn.  Recall that W and x were set based on 
the expectation of u, but, as shown, effort rises when u rises and the definition of a recession is 
that the demand for output falls.  This implies that employment needs to be adjusted downward.  
Which workers should be laid off? Because this is a fixed wage contract, (4) implies that the firm 
should lay off those workers whose expected output during the recession is the lowest.  
 Note that this is not necessarily the low ability workers as denoted by having the lowest 
k.  Recall that low ability workers, whose output is lowest during normal times, might increase 
their effort the most during a recession because the probability of obtaining another job may be 
related to k.  As a result, although the composition of the workforce should change in the 
direction of higher effort workers, this does not necessarily imply that one can predict which 
workers are to be laid off based on their pre-recession levels of output.  It is the ex post effort 
that matters so there is not an unambiguous prediction of how layoffs or composition of the work 
force should relate to the fixed effects that are estimated before the recession. 
 The implication of this section is that effort rises unambiguously for each worker who is 
retained and the composition of the workforce should shift toward those who will be most 
productive during the recession, but this is not necessarily those who were most productive 
before the recession. 
II. Data 
 The data consist of daily productivity measures from a large services company.  The jobs 
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in the company are what we label “technology based service” jobs or “TBS jobs.”  
Confidentiality restrictions limit our ability to reveal the exact nature of the work.  Examples of 
TBS jobs include insurance-claims processing, computer-based test grading, technical call 
centers, retailing jobs such as cashiers, movie theater concession stand employees, in-house IT 
specialists, airline gate agents, technical repair workers, and a large number of other jobs.   
 These jobs have a common defining feature:   a computer tracks the productivity of each 
individual worker.  Many production processes in services now fit this description, and TBS jobs 
are widespread.  The technology that is used to measure performance may be a new computer-
based monitoring system such as an ERP (Enterprise Resource Planning) system that records a 
worker’s productivity each day (such as the number of windshield repair visits done by each 
Safelite
®
 worker (Lazear, 2000b; Shaw and Lazear, 2008)), cash registers that record each 
transaction under an employee ID number, call centers, or computer-monitored data entry.   
 The data contain four years of daily productivity transaction records between June 2006 
and May 2010.  There are 23,580 unique workers for a total worker-day sample size of about 5.6 
million observations.
11
  The data come from many establishments spanning a large number of 
states, but the number of establishments and the exact number of states cannot be revealed for 
confidentiality reasons.
12
   
 Many of the empirical results exploit the fact that workers in different locations 
experienced different unemployment rates over the business cycle.  Importantly, at any point in 
                                                 
11
 The data also contain information on each worker’s boss, or supervisor.  The quality of the supervisor also 
influences the productivity of the worker, as is emphasized in Lazear, Shaw, and Stanton (2015).  There are 1,630  
bosses. 
12
 To study the effect of the recession on productivity, we restrict the data to locations with sufficient operating 
history prior to the recession.  We also drop the data from the first month of operations for new establishments. 
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time, the company did not change the nature of the task or the task assignment process across 
establishments.  This company has multiple different service functions, but, for the productivity 
measure used here, the data come from one task classification where workers are involved in 
general transactions.  This ensures that all workers in the sample perform the exact same 
expected task across establishments.  In addition, the output from the task is geographically 
portable, so local demand conditions do not affect task assignment.  During the sample period, 
the task assignment process remained constant, and the company did not change the task 
distribution in response to local labor market conditions or local demand for the service.   
 In this company, the productivity of the worker is controlled by the worker’s effort. 
Because the job is discrete, as in the case of a windshield repair as analyzed in the Safelite study 
(where a job consists of installing one windshield), productivity depends solely on the speed with 
which the worker performs the task.  Although each assigned job may vary in difficulty, in 
expectation every job assignment is the same.    Additionally, downtime is minimized by altering 
the total number of workers at any point in time.  In fact, workers are sent home when there are 
too many to accommodate demand.  
 The information technology system measures the time it takes to process a customer 
transaction from beginning to end.  If there is slack time because there are no customers, this 
downtime is not measured.  Productivity is, therefore, the average number of transactions a 
worker handles in an hour, when the hour working is measured from total processing time.
 13
  
The worker can increase his transactions by processing customers more quickly.  
 This definition of productivity is better than most for measuring effort since it is not 
                                                 
13
 There is no data on the number of hours the worker is scheduled to work per day. 
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directly affected by demand conditions.  The measure of productivity that is used here does not 
vary with slack time.  Because productivity is defined as the reciprocal of time taken to complete 
the average job assignment, down time between jobs does not directly affect the measure.  In this 
respect, it differs from the macro productivity measures that compute output per unit of clock 
time on the job, not actual working time on the job. As a consequence, the measure used here 
does not capture productivity declines during recessions that may be associated with labor 
hoarding. In the recessions that characterized the earlier periods (the 1980s and before) and those 
in other countries, labor productivity falls because hours worked fall by a smaller percentage 
than output. The measure used here, however, is a direct measure of effort because it nets out any 
slack.  It is not completely devoid of slack time considerations, however, because the amount of 
slack time could affect effort during those periods when work occurs, say because more slack 
allows workers to increase their speed when they are actually working.  In the production context 
analyzed here, this is not a major problem.  Slack is minimal in all times because of the work 
assignment algorithm.  Additionally, a measure of slack time exists and is discussed later.  
 For our purposes, the measure used, which abstracts from slack time, is exactly the 
correct measure.  Our goal is to determine whether firms make do with less because workers step 
up their effort level during recessions.  If the speed at which they actually work responds to 
recession and unemployment pressure, then the mechanism that we have in mind is operating. 
 This does not necessarily imply that productivity at the macro level would rise on net.  It 
is possible that increased slack time during a recession is sufficient to offset any increase in 
speed during time actually worked, but slack due to deficient demand is most determined by the 
employer.  If productivity rises at the aggregate level despite the possibility of increased slack, 
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then it must be because productivity during time actually worked rises, which is exactly what is 
tested using the data from this particular firm. 
 One final fact is worthy of note. Workers in this firm are paid an hourly wage rate.  The 
data do not contain workers’ wages, but the firm has a common set of human resources policies 
across establishments.
14
  While the firm could pay for performance since output is monitored 
carefully, they do not do so.   
III. Empirical Results 
Summary Statistics  
 The first finding is that there is an increase in productivity during the recession and post-
recession period.  As shown in Table 1, log output per hour rises from an average of 2.21 units 
during the pre-recession period (June 2006 through November 2007) to an average of 2.33 units 
during the recession and post-recession period. The simple averages imply that productivity rose 
during the recession. Of course, these are only simple statistics and do not speak to whether the 
change comes about because workers increase effort, or because the composition of workers 
change. These specifics are examined later.  
 Two other measures of productivity are available in the data.  The first is uptime, defined 
as the percentage of time a worker is physically available to receive transactions during his or her 
shift.  Uptime captures effort as well as demand conditions.  The second measure is a quality 
score, taken from an audit or post-transaction survey.  Summary statistics on quality are not 
presented because the scale of the measure and frequency of its collection change over time.  
 Figure 1 shows the time path of employment.  As is clear, this is a growing firm in the 
                                                 
14
 Front-line supervisors have limited discretion to alter wages; to the extent that management adjusted wages in 
response to unemployment or local labor market conditions, the resulting estimates are likely to be understated. 
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pre- and post- recession period, but, as is evident from the figure, growth in employment falls 
during the recession and is even negative during some months. Mean tenure rises during the 
recession to 699 days, from 680 days in the non-recession period; this is consistent with the 
slowdown in hiring and quitting economy-wide.
1516
  Figure 2 shows graphically the results 
reported in Table 1 for output-per-hour.  Productivity rises during the recession. 
 Productivity Effects of the Recession  
 Table 2 examines productivity during the recession in a more refined way by including 
worker tenure and worker and boss effects, where appropriate.
1718
   The basic estimating 
equation for Table 2 is  
(5) log(qijt )=  γ1Rt + Xitβ + ζj  + εijt.  
where qijt is the output per hour of worker i at establishment j at time t.  The dummy variable Rt 
captures the recession period from December 2007 through May 2009.  The matrix Xit contains a 
fifth order polynomial in workers’ tenure, a cubic polynomial in time, and 11 month dummies to 
control for seasonality; ζj is an establishment fixed effect.   
 The overall effect of the recession is an increase in productivity of 5.4 percent, which 
comes from column 1 of Table 2. There is a sizable jump in productivity, holding constant 
seasonal and location-specific effects as well as those which reflect trend changes in 
productivity.   
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 JOLTS (Job Opening and Labor Turnover Survey) data show significant reduction in churn in the broader 
economy. 
16
 There are no data available on the causes of worker attrition.  Attrition is defined as a worker being no longer 
present on production tasks either because of promotion, firing, or voluntary exit.  There is a temporary spike in 
attrition in December 2007 and January 2008. 
17
 See Lazear, Shaw and Stanton (2015) for a discussion of the importance of boss effects. 
18
 Because we model the productivity of workers within establishments, we need not control for the restructuring of 
firms that involves the closing of the least productive establishments during recessions (Davis and Haltiwanger, 
1990; Garin, Pries and Sims, 2011; Rebitzer, 1987).  
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 As mapped out in the theory, there are two channels through which productivity can 
increase during recessions.  First, a given worker may put forth more effort during recessions. 
Second, the composition of the workforce may change in the direction of higher quality workers 
being employed during recessions.  This is an empirical question.  Does the increase in 
productivity during the recession come from people on the job working harder or from the 
attraction and retention of higher caliber people?   Estimating productivity equation (5) with a 
person fixed effect sheds light on this question.
19 
 
 A worker fixed effect, αi, is added to the productivity regression in column 2 of Table 2.  
If more productive individuals are employed during the recession due to compositional shifts in 
the workforce, there will be a positive correlation between Rt and αi and the estimate of γ1 will 
decline when worker fixed effects are added to the regression.  The productivity gains appear to 
be from increased effort, not sorting.  During the recession, productivity rises by 5.4 percent in 
the worker fixed effects model (column 2), which is the same as the OLS estimate.  There is no 
evidence that the increased productivity effect is a result of changes in composition of the 
workforce.  Column 3 adds boss fixed effects.  The results are essentially unchanged.   
 To test whether sorting can explain the results, note that if sorting of workers to the firm 
does not change over time, regressions using a balanced sample of continuously employed 
workers should produce the same estimates as the sample with the entry and exit of workers to 
the firm.  This is a slightly different experiment than the one performed in column 2 of Table 2.  
There, fixed effects are estimated by using all workers, but those workers are not necessarily 
present throughout the entire period.  The balanced sample is more restrictive, using only those 
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 The methods follow those of Lazear (2000b).  
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workers who are employed throughout the entire sample period. The estimate is very similar.  
Column 4 of Table 2 follows the 1,623 workers (with 1.1 million daily productivity measures) 
for those who are continuously employed in the three phases of the pre-recession period, the 
recession period, and the post-recession period.  The productivity gain during the recession is 
estimated as 4.8 percent, little changed from the OLS recession effect of 5.4 percent for the full 
data set of 23 thousand workers.
20
   
 A direct way to analyze composition is to examine whether the exit or entry of workers to 
the firm is related to worker quality. To do this, a regression that includes dummies for leaving 
the job or for beginning with the firm during the recession are included.  The sign of the leavers 
dummy is indeterminate because some leavers were laid off and are likely to be low quality, but 
some are quitters who may be high quality.
21
 The new-hires dummy should enter positively 
because better workers are available for hire during the recession at the same price.   
 The results are shown in (6).
 22
 
 
(6)    log(qijt) = 0.053 Recession - 0.0002 Left during recession +0.015 Hired during recession.  
            (0.001)                   (0.0024)               (0.003) 
 The estimates show no quality differential for leavers, but those hired during the 
recession are 1.5 percent more productive than all others.  However, the new-hires impact on 
                                                 
20
 One other potential bias is the inability to account for changes in the capital stock.  To the extent that the firm 
increased the capital stock, the time controls should pick this up unless there was a significant increase in investment 
during the recession relative to trend; this seems unlikely.  Moreover, the regression contains establishment 
dummies.  This is important because once an establishment is built, its capital stock is likely to remain generally 
fixed over time. It is especially unlikely to be correlated with changes in local unemployment rates, on which the 
bulk of the conclusions rest. 
21
 The market may infer that those who are laid off are of lower quality (Gibbons and Katz, 1992). 
22
 The regression is estimated by OLS and contains the same control variables as in column 1 of Table 2.  The 
sample is restricted to establishments with data in the pre-recession period.  It is also possible that the composition 
of the workforce differs over the recession.   To allow for this possibility, equation (6) was also estimated with week 
fixed effects.  The point estimates (standard errors) on Left during recession and Hired during recession are -0.00004 
(0.0036) and 0.0089 (0.0032), respectively. 
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productivity is small because new-hires are only 30 percent of all those working during the 
recession;
23
 the total impact of new-hires on aggregate productivity is 1.5*.3 = .005. 
 The conclusion that composition explains only a small fraction of the productivity change 
holds up after additional tests for worker sorting.  A simple analysis is presented here, and the 
appendix contains additional results that assess counterfactual productivity in the absence of 
attrition.  In what follows, the productivity difference between stayers and leavers is calculated 
as the monthly average of productivity for those workers who stay compared with those who 
leave.  Although it is possible to compare the distribution of fixed effects before and during the 
recession, this ignores the possibility that different workers may respond differently to the 
recession, as implied by the theory.  As a consequence, it is better to use the raw data to estimate 
the effect of composition differences.  That is what is done below. For this purpose, the 
productivity for workers who leave is measured in the calendar month prior to a worker’s 
departure. The results suggest that attrition accounts for a relatively small portion of the 
change in productivity over the recession.  Figure 3 plots the instantaneous effect on total 
productivity from attrition.  The instantaneous effect is computed as [log(oph)Stayers,t+1 - 
log(oph)Leavers,t+1] x shareLeavers, which is the mean productivity difference between workers who 
remain (stayers) and workers who leave in the month prior to attrition times the share of the 
workforce that leaves.  The cumulative productivity effect is plotted on the right y-axis and is 
calculated as the running total of all past share-weighted productivity differences between stayers 
and leavers.  From this calculation, at the end of the recession the total effect of attrition on 
aggregate productivity is about 0.01, which is less than one-fifth of the total change in 
                                                 
23
 The ratio of observations of new-hires to all those working during the recession is about .3. 
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productivity.  
Productivity Effects of Varying Local Unemployment Rates 
 The most compelling evidence of the recession-based effort effect comes from the next 
analysis of the impact of varying local unemployment rates on productivity.  The theory predicts 
that cross-sectional as well as time series unemployment rates should affect productivity.  The 
theory relates most directly to the local unemployment rate and the evidence below is consistent 
with the theoretical analysis.  
 The theory relies on variations in workers’ alternative use of time as the impetus for the 
effect of recessions on productivity.    An increase in the unemployment rate makes finding an 
alternative job more difficult, which reduces the relative cost of effort.
 
Workers in various 
establishments in the firm experienced differences in unemployment conditions over the five 
years of the data.
 24
 Statewide variations in unemployment rates are large, not only on average, 
but also as they changed during the recession.  For example, in Florida, the unemployment rate 
rose from 3.3% to 11.2% from June 2006 to May 2010.  In Kansas, the unemployment rate rose 
from 4.4% to 7.1% over the same period.   
 The original productivity regression (5) can be modified to make use of differences in 
labor market conditions.  The model is  
 (7)  log(qijt) =  γ2UnempRijt + Xitβ + ζj +  αi  + τt + εijt.  
where UnempRijt is the monthly unemployment rate by state matched to each establishment j and 
τt is a year-by-month fixed effect. The year-by-month fixed effects remove common time-series 
shocks to the unemployment rate and firm productivity, so the model is identified using across-
                                                 
24
 In work on the efficiency wage hypothesis, Cappelli and Chauvin (1991) rely on interplant variation in wage 
premiums.   
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establishment variation in the unemployment rate within a given month.   
 Standard errors are clustered by state.  The p-values of statistical tests are computed using 
a t distribution with G-2 degrees of freedom, where G is the number of states. Statistical 
inference is robust to alternative techniques to correct for clustering.
25
   
 The model with establishment fixed effects, year-by-month fixed effects, and a fifth order 
polynomial in tenure (column 1, Table 3) gives a point estimate of 0.008 for the unemployment 
rate effect.  This corresponds to a 3.9% increase in productivity for a 5 percentage point increase 
in the local unemployment rate, which is the size of the increase in the national unemployment 
rate from just prior to the recession to the recession peak rate.
26
   The next two columns add 
worker and boss fixed effects, respectively. The final column reports the results for the balanced 
sample. The unemployment rate effect is similar across all specifications, and indicates that 
individual workers increase their effort in response to worsening local labor market conditions.  
In labor intensive industries that are as competitive as the industry surrounding this firm, even a 
4 percent increase in productivity is sizable.   
 Figure 4 splits the sample into states that established relatively high and low 
unemployment changes during the recession and examines the evolution of productivity over 
time for each group. As is clear from the diagram, productivity rises during the recession more in 
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 Recent papers suggest corrections for inference in settings with a small number of clusters (Cameron, Gelbach, 
and Miller 2008; Donald and Lang 2007).  Much of this analysis relies on simulations with various assumptions 
about the nature of clustering.  No existing simulations accord with the environment here, where there is a relatively 
large number of time periods, a huge number of individuals within each cluster, a covariate of interest with 
substantial time series and cross-cluster variation, and possible intra-cluster correlation of the error in the cross 
section and time series correlation in the error for each individual.  To assess the reliability of inference, data with 
these properties were simulated to examine whether rejection rates differ from the theoretical rejection rate when 
using a t distribution with G-2 degrees of freedom and when using the wild cluster percentile t bootstrap.  Using the 
t-distribution, rejection rates are too large by a factor of about 1.7.  Using the wild cluster procedure leads to 
substantial under-rejection.  In 200 Monte Carlo experiments, the null was never rejected.   
26
 The rate increased from about 5.0 percent to about 10.0 percent.  This approximately matches the increase in the 
unemployment rate in the sample, from 4.55 to 9.71. 
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those establishments where the change in unemployment is greatest. 
 It is difficult to imagine any other factor that could affect worker productivity and would 
vary with local unemployment rates, holding constant both establishment and time effects. The 
estimates in Table 3 are obtained by examining the increase in productivity that results when 
local unemployment rates are high given both the time period in which and establishment at 
which the worker is employed.  For this reason, Table 3 is the most direct test of the increased-
effort hypothesis. The fact that worker output goes up most in those areas that have the highest 
unemployment relative to the average for a given time period and establishment is evidence that 
workers are responding to the reduced likelihood of obtaining an alternative job.  The estimates 
are based on the entire period and do not depend on formal definitions of recession.  They play 
off the differences in unemployment rates relative to what would be expected for a given 
establishment and given time period, recession or not. 
 Appendix Table 1 presents several additional specifications to assess the sensitivity of the 
estimates.  To account for measurement error in the unemployment rate, an IV estimate using the 
lagged unemployment rate as an instrument for the concurrent rate increases the parameter 
estimates only slightly.  The parameter estimates are also robust to the inclusion of establishment 
level specific time trends for those states with multiple establishments.  Results with linear trends 
are presented; they are similar to results with quadratic trends. 
 Uptime and Quality 
 As discussed earlier, there are two additional productivity measures.  Because slack time 
is omitted from the output-per-hour calculation, the estimated effect corresponds directly to 
effort. Uptime is an additional measure that relates more directly to slack time.  
  25 
 The uptime results are important for putting the interpretation of slack changes into 
perspective.  Interviews with the company suggest that workers are sent home in periods of high 
slack, but they are expected to be at their workstation handling transactions in periods of high 
demand.  Uptime does not measure slack perfectly, however.  Uptime measures the proportion of 
time-card time during which the worker is ready to be assigned a task, but it is still possible that 
time could pass between tasks. 
 The mean uptime in the sample is 0.963, meaning that workers are available to process 
transactions for over 96 percent of their working hours.  Panel A of Table 4 contains the results 
from regressions with uptime as the dependent variable.  The point estimates on the local 
unemployment rate are positive but statistically insignificant in columns with establishment 
effects.  The results are similar when adding worker and worker and boss fixed effects. Not only 
do workers increase the speed with which they perform any given task, but there is no evidence 
that they increase the amount of slack time during recessions by taking more leisure on the job. If 
this were the case, the coefficient on the local unemployment rate would be expected to be 
negative.  It remains possible, however, that total down time increases during recessions if there 
were a longer time lapse between actual task assignments.  
 An additional measure of productivity is quality, measured from a post-transaction 
assessment.  Positive scores correspond to higher quality.  While the scale of the quality measure 
changes over time, with time fixed effects in a regression it is possible to assess whether the 
output-per-hour increase due to the local unemployment rate is driven by reductions in 
transaction quality.  The results in Panel B of Table 4 suggest slightly positive increases in 
quality with respect to the unemployment rate, mitigating concerns that multi-task considerations 
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drive the increased output per hour. 
 In summary, productivity rises when and where unemployment rates are high, reflecting 
higher effort in high unemployment areas and times. Because the value of the workers’ 
alternatives decline with the unemployment rate, the theory predicts and results confirm that 
effort should increase as unemployment rises. 
Heterogeneity in the Response: Stars and Laggards 
 Workers need not respond equally to the recession. Two groups of workers are 
considered.  Define “laggards” as those who are less productive than the median worker.  
Presumably, they face higher unemployment rates and lower quality future jobs.  Analogously, 
define “stars” as those who are more productive than the median. Presumably, they face lower 
unemployment rates and higher quality alternative job offers.  As described in the theory section, 
laggards may or may not respond more to the recession than stars.  The theory implies that the 
less skilled group will increase their effort less for a given change in unemployment, but that 
unemployment is likely to rise more for the less skilled.  The predicted effect of skill level on 
productivity is therefore ambiguous.    
 The data on workers who enter the firm in the pre-recession period are used to assess 
whether stars or laggards are most responsive to the recession.  Workers are classified into the 
two ability categories based on their pre-recession productivity. Specifically, stars are those 
workers whose worker specific fixed effect, αi, is above the median using data on workers’ first 
60 days of tenure when regression (5) is estimated with a worker fixed effect for those 60 days.
27
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 Workers with entry dates prior to the beginning of our sample with more than 60 days of tenure are not included.  
The sample includes only workers whose first day of work is both present in the sample and occurs prior to 
11/1/2007.  The 11/1/2007 cutoff period is used to ensure that workers in the pre-recession estimation sample have 
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Laggards are those with below median worker fixed effect estimated in the above manner.  There 
are 3,121 laggards and there are 2,942 stars (the discrepancy is due to taking a median weighted 
by days of work).  
 There is a significant difference in the effect of the recession on stars’ and laggards’ 
productivity.  Laggards increase their productivity in response to increases in the local 
unemployment rate by more than do stars.  If the threat of unemployment and the alternative job 
is poorer for laggards than for stars, one might expect that the effort of laggards would rise by 
more than that for stars.   
 Column 1 of Table 5 repeats the specification in Table 3.  In these models, stars’ effort 
response to the local unemployment rate is minimal and insignificant.  Laggards, however, 
increase their effort substantially.   In this specification, which includes year x month and 
establishment fixed effects, laggards’ productivity increases by 5.65 percent in response to a 5 
percentage point increase in the local unemployment rate.  Results are similar when adding boss 
fixed effects. 
 To account for the possibility that mean reversion is driving the results, the last two 
columns of Table 5 classify stars and laggards using the residuals, in levels, from an Anderson-
Hsiao dynamic panel data model estimated on weekly averages.  This technique better isolates 
permanent unobserved heterogeneity from state dependence or mean-reverting shocks in the 
classification of stars and laggards.  The results are identical. 
IV.  External Validity 
 Recall that aggregate productivity rose by 3.16 percent from the start of the recession to 
                                                                                                                                                             
at least some data from which to estimate their fixed effect that is not contaminated by the recession.   
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the quarter following the recession.  It is well known that less-educated workers experience 
larger rises in unemployment during recessions than to well-educated workers.  This section 
assesses whether shifts in employment composition can explain a significant portion of the 
productivity gain experienced during the recession.   
 The gain in productivity can be decomposed into that due to a shift in the composition of 
the workforce to the more skilled, which for the purposes here is defined as the better educated,  
versus an increase in the within education group productivity.   Aggregate productivity is the 
weighted sum of the within-group productivity or  
     P s pi i  
where si is the share of the workforce accounted for by group i and pi is the productivity of that 
group. It then follows that changes in productivity can be decomposed as  
    ∑     ̅       ̅
 
 
The change is the sum of the changes in the shares ∆si, weighted by the average productivity for 
that group,  ̅  , and changes in productivity, ∆pi , weighted by average shares,  ̅ .
28
    
 The issue is determining how much of the total change in productivity during the recent 
recession can be attributed to the composition effect, which is the first term of the 
decomposition. Although within-sector productivity cannot be measured, an approximation to 
the first term is possible.  It is obtained as follows. 
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 The cross-terms are negligible for small changes. 
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Assume that the ratio of productivity
29
 to average wage is constant over the period in question.
30
  
Define that ratio at the aggregate level to be 
 P / W ≡ λ 
where W is the average wage at the economy level and P is productivity at the economy level.  
Assume further that the ratio of productivity to wage for group i is also given by λ so that  
 pi / wi = λ  
or  
(8) pi  = λ wi   . 
 The relevant data are available directly from government sources
31
 over the period 2000-
2012 to obtain an estimate of λ.  The within-group wage can be obtained from the Current 
Population Surveys by calculating average wage of group i during the recession period. 
 With these data, it is possible to compute the proportion of the productivity change that is 
a result of the change in the composition of the workforce during the recession period of 
December, 2007 – June, 2009.  This is 
(9)                                 s p s wi i i i    
where   ̅̅ ̅ is the average wage over the time period and pi  is the average productivity of group i 
over the time period as defined above. Using (8),  
 pi  = λ wi  
so that (9) can be estimated directly from observable information. 
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 In the data used, this is defined as an index, normalized to 100 in the base year. 
30
 Although this ratio likely changed over time, this assumption is made solely for the purposes of estimating how 
compositional changes in the labor market would have changed productivity holding fixed productivity for each 
group.  A non-constant ratio will enter the residual.   
31
 Department of Labor, BLS data are used as described in Table 5. 
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 Table 6 presents the results of the decomposition. The total change in productivity over 
the recession was 1.937, which was 1.87 percent of the output index. The sum of the productivity 
changes induced by changes in relative shares of the educational groups equals .364, so about 19 
percent of the total productivity change during the recession can be explained by composition 
effects. Therefore, at the level of the economy, the conclusion is that changing shares of worker 
quality groups based on education do not explain much of the gain in productivity during the 
recession.  Other factors, like increased effort, must account for the lion’s share of the increased 
productivity.       
 
V. Conclusion 
 Aggregate productivity has risen during recent recessions.  There are two possible 
explanations for increased productivity during recessions.  The first   is that firms lay off workers 
and each employed worker is working harder.  Firms make do with less because worker effort 
rises during recessions when the workers’ alternatives decline. The second is that firms are 
sorting workers, retaining the highly productive and letting go the least productive.  By using 
detailed panel data from one firm in which measures of individual worker output are available 
during recession and non-recession periods, it is possible to disentangle these alternative causes 
of the rise in productivity that occurred during the 2007-9 recession.  
 The main finding is that productivity rose in this firm because the firm made do with less. 
Each worker produced more output than would have been the case during normal times: output-
per-worker rose during the recession by 5.4 percent. Labor quality changes throughout the 
recession period were small despite a large amount of turnover.  
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 Because the data are from many different establishments across the country, it is possible 
to examine the effects by local labor market conditions.  In those areas where the recession was 
most pronounced, the productivity gains are the strongest and the increase in effort the greatest.  
This same conclusion holds for non-recession years, when cross-sectional increases in 
unemployment are associated with increased worker productivity.  
 Finally, it appears that the less productive workers are most responsive to recessions and 
increases in local unemployment rates, perhaps because their alternatives diminish the most 
during weak economic times. 
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Figures and Tables  
 
Figure 1:  Average number of workers-per-day aggregated to the monthly level (in blue) is 
plotted against an estimated number of workers (in red) where the estimates come from a 
regression of average workers-per-day on a cubic polynomial in time, excluding the recession 
period.   
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Figure 2: Monthly mean log productivity per worker, Log OPH, over time.  Vertical red lines 
indicate recession beginning and end.   
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Figure 3: The figure presents the total effect on log productivity due to attrition.  The current 
period effect is computed as [log(oph)Stayers,t+1 - log(oph)Leavers,t+1] x shareLeavers.  The cumulative 
effect is a running total over time.    Vertical red lines indicate recession beginning and end.   
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Figure 4: The figure presents local polynomial smoothed estimates of the average monthly log 
output-per-hour for workers in states with above-median unemployment changes between 
November 2007 and January 2009 (blue solid line) and below-median unemployment changes 
(red dashed line).  The median change in unemployment over this period, using the state as the 
unit of analysis, is 3.2 percentage points.  Confidence intervals are displayed in gray.   
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Table 1:  Summary Statistics 
       
 
Pre-Recession 
Recession and 
Post-
Recession 
  (1) (2) 
   
Log Output Per Hour 2.21 2.33 
 
(0.29) (0.28) 
 
  Uptime 0.96 0.96 
 
(0.03) (0.03) 
   Tenure (days) 568 695 
 
(540) (640) 
   State Unemployment Rate 4.55 8.05 
 
(1.02) (2.52) 
 
  N 1,883,328 3,744,345 
      
 
  
Notes:  Means are reported with standard deviations in parentheses below.   
The Pre-Recession period is June 2006 - November 2007.  The data end in 
May 2010.  Output per hour is the average number of transactions a 
worker handles in an hour, when the hour working is measured from time 
spent processing transactions.  Uptime is the fraction of shift time that a 
worker is able to receive transactions. The mean unemployment rate at the 
peak of the recession in Quarter 2 of 2009 is 9.71 percent (2.11).   
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Table 2:  The Effect of the Recession on Productivity 
      Dependent Variable:  Log (Output per Hour) 
  
 
     
  Entire Sample   Balanced Sample 
 
 Establishment 
Fixed Effects 
Worker Fixed 
Effects 
Worker and Boss 
Fixed Effects 
  
 Establishment 
Fixed Effects 
  (1) (2) (3)   (4) 
      
Recession 
0.054 0.054 0.053 
 
0.048 
(0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.004) 
      
N 5,627,673 5,627,673 5,627,673 
 
1,104,889 
R
2
 0.071 0.251 0.256   0.05 
 
     
Notes: The Entire Sample contains daily data from June 2006 to May 2010, for 23,580 workers.  The Balanced 
Sample contains only those 1,623 workers who were employed before October 2006 and who remain in the 
sample as of May 2010.  All specifications contain fifth order polynomials in tenure, establishment fixed effects, 
and 11 month fixed effects.  OLS regressions contain cubic polynomials in time.  Regressions with worker fixed 
effects contain time squared and time cubed.  Robust standard errors are clustered at the state level.  Standard 
errors are calculated by pairs cluster bootstrap in column (3) to deal with having both worker and boss fixed 
effects.  
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Table 3: Productivity Regressions with the Local Unemployment Rate
Balanced  Sample
 Establishment 
Fixed Effects
Worker Fixed 
Effects
Worker and Boss 
Fixed Effects
 Establishment 
Fixed Effects
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Monthly unemployment rate in state 0.008 0.008 0.007 0.009
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
P-value against null of 0 0.013 0.007 0.047 0.013
Impact of 5 % change in unemployment 0.039 0.041 0.037 0.044
N 5,627,673 5,627,673 5,627,673 1,104,889
R
2 0.076 0.259 0.262 0.054
Entire Sample
Notes: For notes on sample composition, see Table 2. All models include a fifth-order polynomial for workers' tenure, year x
month fixed effects, and establishment fixed effects. Robust standard errors are clustered at the state level. Standard errors are
calculated by pairs cluster bootstrap using the state as the unit of analysis in column (3) with boss and worker fixed effects;
calculating the variance-covariance matrix analytically is not possible. In all cases, the p-value against the null of 0 is computed
using a t distribution (2 tailed) with G-2 degrees of freedom, where G is the number of clusters. An alternative set of calculations
uses the empirical distribution of bootstrap estimates. The distribution of bootstrap parameter values from column (3) has 1 out
of 80 draws with a value less than zero. The wild cluster bootstrap t, imposing the null hypothesis of 0, was also used to assess
the robustness of inference. The model in column (2) was estimated using data aggregated to the monthly level because of
computational considerations. The parameter estimate when using monthly aggregation was 0.0099 with a 2-tailed p-value of
0.038. Monte Carlo evidence from an experiment generating data with the exact sample size and degree of serial correlation in
the residuals from the monthly aggregated version of column (2) suggests that the wild cluster bootstrap t under-rejects in this
setting.  
    Dependent Variable:  Log (Output per Hour)
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Table 4: Productivity Regressions with the Local Unemployment Rate
    Dependent Variables:  Uptime and Quality
 Establishment Fixed 
Effects
Worker Fixed Effects
Worker and Boss 
Fixed Effects
(1) (2) (3)
Panel A:  Uptime
Monthly unemployment rate in state 0.0003 0.0004 0.0004
(0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0005)
Impact of 5 % change in unemployment 
relative to mean downtime 0.038 0.051 0.051
Mean of dependent variable in pre-
recession period 0.961 0.961 0.961
N 4,863,587 4,863,587 4,863,587
R
2
0.013 0.094 0.099
Panel B: Quality
Monthly unemployment rate in state 0.0196 0.0179 0.015
(0.0089) (0.0094) (0.011)
N 359,658 359,658 359,658
R
2
0.775 0.79 0.793
Notes: All models include a fifth order polynomial for workers' tenure, time period (year x month) fixed effects, and
establishment fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the state level. In the uptime model, the impact of a 5
percent change in unemployment is calculated relative to a "downtime" baseline, where mean downtime is 1 - mean
uptime. Quality is increasing in the score, but the scale of the survey instrument changes over time; no comparison
is made relative to a mean score for the quality measures.  
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Table 5: Productivity Regressions for Stars and Laggards
    Dependent Variable:  Log (Output per Hour)
 Establishment Fixed 
Effects, Laggard 
Classification Method 
1
Boss Fixed Effects, 
Laggard Classification 
Method 1
 Establishment Fixed 
Effects, Laggard 
Classification Method 
2
Boss Fixed Effects, 
Laggard Classification 
Method 2
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Laggard -0.224 -0.224 -0.219 -0.218
(0.0152) -0.016 (0.015) (0.016)
0.001 0.001 0.0001 0.001
(0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004)
0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
P-value against null of 0 on interaction term 0 0 0 0
N 1,765,499 1,765,499 1,691,163 1,691,163
R
2 0.188 0.207 0.197 0.215
Monthly unemployment rate in state
Notes: The sample used to classify stars and laggards includes workers with less than 60 days of tenure and whose first day of work is prior to
November 1st, 2007. Stars and laggards are classified according to method 1 based on whether a worker's estimated fixed effect is above or below
the median of the distribution of worker fixed effects after regressing log(oph) on a fifth order polynomial in tenure, time (year x month) fixed
effects, establishment fixed effects, and worker fixed effects. The sample used to classify stars and laggards according to method 2 aggregates the
data to the weekly level and includes fewer workers because of the need for lagged data at the weekly level. Stars and laggards are classified
according to method 2 using the mean residual in levels after an Anderson-Hsiao dynamic panel regression that allows for mean reversion in
productivity. The model is a two-stage least squares regression where the first difference of log(oph) is regressed on the lagged first difference of
log(oph), first differences of the tenure polynomial, and time fixed effects. The instrument for the lagged difference is the second lag of log(oph)
in levels. The parameter estimate on the lag of log(oph) is 0.100 with standard error .015. Each of the reported second stage specifications
contains matched data from the first stage. These specifications contain a fifth order polynomial in workers' tenure, establishment, and time (year
x month dummies). Robust standard errors are clustered at the state level. The p-value is computed using a t distribution with G-2 degrees of
freedom where G is the number of clusters.  
Monthly unemployment rate in state x Laggard
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Table 6:  Productivity Level Decomposition by Education 
                =  
 
 
  
2007:Q4-
2009:Q2  
  
                           pt-pt0 1.9370 
 ̅ 103.6427 
  ∑∆   ̅  ∑∆   ̅ (
 ̅ 
 ̅ 
⁄ ) 
   
< HS -0.0698 
HS Diploma -0.4142 
Some Coll. or A.A. 0.1318 
B.A. and Beyond 0.7161 
Sum 0.3639 
    
Source: CPS data downloaded from www.bls.gov/cps 
Source: Productivity data downloaded from www.bls.gov/lpc 
Productivity and wage data for those employed full time. 
Education results are for the population aged 25+. 
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Appendix Table 1: Results from Alternative Specifications
 Establishment Fixed 
Effects, IV
Worker Fixed Effects, 
IV
 Establishment Fixed 
Effects, Establishment 
Time Trends
Worker Fixed Effects, 
Establishment Time 
Trends
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A:  Log (Output Per Hour)
Monthly unemployment rate in state 0.008 0.008 0.011 0.01
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
N 5,627,673 5,627,673 3,063,646 3,063,646
Panel B: Uptime
Monthly unemployment rate in state 0.00028 0.00036 0.00049 0.0002
(0.00049) (0.00038) (0.00048) (0.00043)
N 4,863,587 4,863,587 2,631,021 2,631,021
Panel C: Quality
Monthly unemployment rate in state 0.022 0.004 0.017 0.011
(0.009) (0.007) (0.024) (0.024)
N 359,658 359,658 197,434 197,434
Notes: All models include a fifth order polynomial for workers' tenure, time period (year x month) fixed effects, and establishment fixed
effects. Standard errors are clustered at the state level. The IV estimates instrument for the concurrent unemployment rate in the state with the
lag of the unemployment rate in the state. The estimates in columns 3 and 4 add establishment-specific time trends. The sample in columns 3
and 4 is limited to those states with mulitple establishments.  
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Appendix 
Additional Analysis on Compositional Changes 
 
If there are heterogeneous effects of the recession on different types of workers, the inference 
about workforce composition changes that comes from comparing OLS and fixed effects 
estimates in the unbalanced panel may not be correct.  The fixed-effect estimate of the recession 
effect is the average effect of changes in productivity across all who worked both in recession 
and non-recession periods. But that does not imply that all workers increased their productivity 
by the same amount.  It is possible that composition changes exist but tend to be masked by 
heterogeneous recession effects.   
 Ignoring the new workers who enter, an additional measure of the recession productivity 
increase due to compositional changes is calculated by taking the difference in actual 
productivity for workers who stay minus estimated productivity for the workforce absent 
attrition.   Obviously unobserved is the productivity of leavers. To estimate counterfactual 
productivity for leavers, workers’ productivity is aggregated to the monthly level and changes in 
monthly productivity are calculated for each worker in the sample of establishments with data 
prior to the recession. The change in the productivity of stayers can then be used as an estimate 
of the change that leavers’ productivity would have experienced during the recession had they 
stayed.  To insure that this is reasonable, we examine the changes in stayer and (eventual) leaver 
productivity before those workers actually leave.  If productivity changes across the two groups 
are similar before, it can be assumed that they would have been similar had the leavers stayed. 
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By regressing changes in productivity for leavers,  y(t-1)Leaver , on mean changes in productivity 
for stayers,  y(t-1)Stayers , prior to a worker’s attrition, it is possible to determine whether 
aggregate counterfactual productivity for leavers can be estimated using productivity changes for 
stayers. The hypothesis that the coefficient is one cannot be rejected, which suggests that it is 
reasonable to use stayer productivity change as a proxy for the unobserved leaver productivity 
change.
32
    Counterfactual productivity for leavers is then computed as  
  y(t+1)
Leavers
 = y(t)
Leavers
 +  y(t+1)Stayers.   
Because the share of new entrants is small in any given month, the change in productivity 
due to compositional differences is approximately  
y(t+1)
Stayers 
- y(t+1)
Stayers
s
Stayers
 - y(t+1)
Leavers
s
Leavers
  
where s
Stayers
 is the share of  stayers and s
Leavers
 is the share of leavers.  Adding across all 
recession months gives a total increase in productivity from compositional factors of 0.68 
percent, relative to a total change of 5.4 percent. In sum, there is an increase in productivity 
during the recession, almost all of which can be attributed to increased effort rather than to 
workforce composition effects.  
 
 
Proof that effort may increase more with unemployment as skill rises 
 
 The goal is to show that 




( )
e
u
k
 0   . 
The second order condition is given by  
(A1) SOC = g’(e)[W- c(e)/k - R(1-u)] - 2g(e)c’(e)/k - G(e)c”(e)/k < 0 
                                                 
32
 This relationship does not change with the recession; a recession main effect and a recession interaction term are 
not statistically different from zero. 
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From the text, 
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which has the sign of   ∂SOC / ∂k .  
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Note that the second-order condition in (A1) can be written as  
 
(A4) g’(e)[W - R(1-u)] - k ∂SOC/∂k 
But since W - R(1-u) is positive (the rent on the primary job is greater than that on the secondary 
job even taking into account the cost of effort),  if g’>0,  ∂SOC/∂k must be positive for (A4), 
which is the second order condition, to be negative.  But if (k ∂SOC/∂k) is positive, then 
∂SOC/∂k is also positive, which implies that     




( )
e
u
k
 0
 
A simple example where g’>0 is a uniform distribution, which has g’=0. 
